Safety and Hazard Analysis
• An F16 pilot was sitting on the runway doing the preflight and wondered if the computer would let him raise the landing gear while on the ground -it did…
• A manufacturer of torpedoes for the U.S. Navy wanted to make a 'safe' torpedo. Their initial solution was to cause the torpedo to self-destruct if it made a 180 degree change in course. On the test run for this new 'safe' torpedo the captain fired the torpedo and nothing happened. So the captain ordered the sub back to base, executing a 180 degree turn… 
Therac-25
The Therac-25 is a computer-controlled radiationtherapy machine developed by the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), a crown corporation. 
Eleven Therac-25s were installed, five in the States and six in Canada. Between June 1985 and January 1987, there were six massive overdoses.
• Kennestone Regional Oncology Center -paralyzed, in pain 
Hazardous Software
Software is hazardous if
• It can cause a hazard (i.e., cause other components to become hazardous)
• It is used to control a hazard
NASA Software Safety Guidebook

Fall 2004 SE 101 Introduction to Software Engineering 11
History of Safety Engineering
• Prior to 1950, engineers used a "fly-fix-fly" process to develop safety-critical systems.
• In the 1950s, the military and aerospace industries started to develop and use predictive safety analysis techniques.
• Identify hazards
• Eliminate, reduce, or control hazardous conditions, to avoid or lessen the severity of accidents.
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Safety Analysis
Different safety analysis techniques address different aspects of the problem.
• Demonstrate the absence of specific hazards.
• Determine the possible damaging effects resulting from hazards
• Determine the causes of a hazard
• Identify safety design criteria that will eliminate, reduce, or control identified hazards.
• Evaluate the adequacy of hazard controls 
Software Failures
Software does not break. Software failures are due to logic or design errors:
• The software has no coding errors, but is written from incorrect requirements
• The requirements are correct, but the software has coding errors that deviate from requirements Thus, software-safety processes often try to improve software safety by improving software correctness.
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NASA Space Shuttle Safety Process
• FMEAs are performed on all shuttle hardware and ground support equipment that interfaces with shuttle hardware at launch sites.
• FMEA-identified hazards that could result in loss of life or vehicle, loss of mission, loss of backup systems, are put on the Critical Items List (CIL)
• Closed-loop system for hazard documentation, resolution, and approval: Items on the CIL must be addressed or a waiver request must be approved before the Shuttle can fly.
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NASA Space Shuttle Safety Process
NASA did not perform hazard analysis on Shuttle software during the software's development, and it does not perform hazard analysis on software upgrades.
• Striving for correct requirements and code
• Making software fault-tolerant through the use of redundancy These activities improve software quality and reliability, but they say nothing about whether the software is free of hazards. 
Therac-25
AECL performed a fault-tree analysis on the Therac-25 that apparently excluded the software. It assumed
• Programming errors had been reduced by extensive testing on a hardware simulator and under field conditions.
• Computer execution errors are caused by faulty hardware components and by "soft" (random) errors introduced by alpha particles and electromagnetic noise.
Fall 2004 SE 101 Introduction to Software Engineering 20
• The first nuclear shutdown system implemented completely in software
• Two independent sub-systems, each of which is responsible for shutting down the nuclear reaction in the event of an accident.
Darlington Nuclear Generating Station
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Darlington Nuclear Generating Station Project:
To determine whether the software and documentation met standards and could be certified as being safe.
Approach: Program Verification
• Model requirements as mathematical functions
• Model code fragments as mathematical functions on program variables
• Prove that the program functions match the requirements functions 
Functional Requirements
A Requirements Table represents a mathematical function that describes a desired behaviour of the system to be developed.
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NewDirection (dir, loc, Req) 
Program Function Tables
Summary
• Ensuring software safety is hard (Therac-25) and expensive (Darlington).
• The state of the practice focuses on software quality and reliability.
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